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I. BACKGROUND
Criticism of big business is not a recent phenomenon in the
United States. A significant history of challenges to large-scale en-
terprises had developed prior to the industrial revolution.' Early
business statutes reflected the public opposition to accumulations
of power that could have an impact on commerce,2 and the suspi-
cion prevailed that the impact of big business would be negative.
Yet businesses increased dramatically in size in this atmosphere of
general public distrust.'
The critics of big business have advanced various reasons in
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law; Student Writing and Research
Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL, REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN Busi-
N ss 497 (1977).
2. One example of the power of popular opinion directed against big business was the
enactment of the 1811 New York General Incorporation Act. The Act limited the general
incorporation of manufacturing ventures to firms with a maximum capitalization of
$100,000. When the state of New York passed the Act, the factory system was already estab-
lished, and textile concerns with capitalization of as much as $1,000,000 operated in other
states. See Sowards & Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development of Corporation Law, 23
U. MIAMI L. REV. 476, 489 (1969).
3. A. CHANDLER, supra note 1.
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support of their positions. A new solution for curing the "problem"
of big business followed each new expression of hostility. The cor-
poration, the typical vehicle for organizing large-scale businesses,
understandably became the target of the antibusiness sentiment.4
The controversy over big business has now focused on its institu-
tional form.
During the past twenty years, two primary and contradictory
criticisms have predominated the discussion. The first of the two is
that the modern corporation separates ownership from control. In
1932, Berle and Means brought that assertion to prominence in
their seminal work The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty.' Separation of ownership from control occurs in businesses
where no individual shareholder or group of related shareholders
owns a controlling interest. Professional managers who have no
controlling ownership stake exercise the responsibility for manag-
ing many such corporations. This arrangement led Berle and
Means to conclude that, because corporation laws impose few insti-
tutional constraints on managerial behavior, managers operate
firms in their own interests rather than for the welfare of share-
holders.' Therefore, the critics argue, damage results to the
shareholders.
The second criticism holds large corporations responsible for
acts that have adversely affected many segments of society. For
example, the critics claim that large corporations discriminate
against minorities, engage in ecological abuses, bribe governmental
officials, deal with undersirable countries, and otherwise engage in
antisocial behavior.' The cure proposed for this behavior is corpo-
rate "social responsibility." The premise underlying this notion is
that large corporations possess unlimited resources for with-
standing the costs of social reform. The characterization of the cor-
poration as a separate juridical entity is appropriate in most legal
contexts, but the use of this fiction in analyzing the question of
who bears the costs of social reform ignores reality. Corporations
serve only as convenient devices for the facilitation of contractual
4. W. MECKLING & M. JENSEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE CORPORATION AS A SOCIAL INVENTION
2 (International Institute for Economic Research Paper No. 18, 1983).
5. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
The general concept that ownership is separated from control has been around at least since
Adam Smith criticized joint stock associations on those same grounds in 1776. A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (E. Cannan ed. 1966).
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 5; see also West, The Role of the Market, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PAST & FUTURE 46, 50 (H. Manne ed. 1982).
7. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
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arrangements among various individuals and groups. The costs and
benefits of social reform must inevitably pass through the corpora-
tion and reach corporate shareholders or creditors, consumers of
corporate products, or the firm's employees.8 It is they who will
bear the brunt of imposing social responsibility on the corporation.
The modern corporation is undeniably a social success, but
success extracts a price. The corporation has attracted many crit-
ics, some of whom advocate reformation of the law to impose insti-
tutional arrangements for controlling the behavior of managers.
Other critics seek rules that would result in transfers of wealth
from one group, such as stockholders, to another group, such as the
constituency that the particular advocate represents. Except for a
theory that would eliminate the concept of private property, rarely
do the critics advocate the abolition of the corporate form.
The corporation did not achieve its success overnight." Indeed,
the modern corporation is the product of centuries of development.
The corporation evolved to its present form through years of fash-
ioning and refashioning different methods of contracting to achieve
different sets of objectives. 10 The dominant status of corporations
resulted from the freedom of individuals to contract in their self-
interest rather than from special privileges conferred by the state.
During the special charter period of American corporation law,
when the corporate form was not the primary structure for busi-
ness, the states extended monopoly benefits and special privileges
to corporations." Industrialization prompted the enactment of the
general incorporation laws in the early part of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Those laws effectively eliminated the monopoly benefits and
privileges afforded by special charters. Even limited liability, which
the general incorporation laws conferred on the corporation, was
not a unique privilege otherwise unavailable to the corporation. Li-
ability could be limited by contract long before statutes provided
for it.1 Thus, the success of the corporation was predicated on the
8. Jensen & Meckling, Can the Corporation Survive?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1983,
at 31.
9. In capital-intensive industries such as manufacturing, the corporate form of organi-
zation dominates, while not-for-profit firms, proprietorships, professional partnerships, and
other partnerships and mutual organizations coexist with the corporation in certain other
industries. For a discussion of the concept of the "separation of ownership from control" in
both corporate and noncorporate organizations, see Fama & Jensen, Separation of Owner-
ship and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
10. Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 2, at 481-85.
11. Id. at 480.
12. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 351, 360-61 (1979).
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ability of participants in the marketplace to contract freely.
The importance to the corporate enterprise of the freedom of
individuals to contract did not go unnoticed by state legislatures.
By attracting firms to incorporate in their states, legislatures could
generate increased tax revenues for their states' coffers. Because of
the revenues resulting from such taxation, states began competing
for incorporations by liberalizing corporate codes. The codes thus
reflected a relaxation of contract restrictions and an increase in
management flexibility.' 3 Accordingly, over the years the states
have amended their general incorporation laws to eliminate many
restrictions on the corporation. For instance, these laws now place
few restrictions on the kind of business in which the corporation
may engage, the amount of capital it may amass, the duration of
its life, the kind of stock that may be sold to raise capital, the
nature and manner by which shareholders' meetings are called,
and how organic changes are made in the corporation.
Relaxation of statutory regulation of the corporation has its
supporters and opponents. Some regard the liberalization as a nec-
essary and logical consequence of the need for the contractual free-
dom that the corporation requires to evolve in a manner that maxi-
mizes its use and productiveness. 14 Others have characterized the
abandonment of restrictions as beneficial to corporate management
and costly to shareholders. For example, Professor Cary character-
ized Delaware's lead in the process of liberalization as the "race for
the bottom."' 5
State law has also attracted criticism for its failure to provide
for institutional arrangements that would require corporate man-
agement to account to shareholders. Advocates of this position be-
lieve that market forces alone are insufficient to accomplish the
goal of accountability. Thus, they argue that the inability of the
market to check the power of management demands a reformation
of the corporation laws.
In the mid- and late 1970's, disenchantment with state regula-
tion of the corporation led to the proposal of a federal statute reg-
ulating large corporations.' 6 The statute was not passed, however,
13. Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 2, at 491-92.
14. W. MECKLING & M. JENSEN, supra note 4, at 8.
15. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
16. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. S3754 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980) (introducted by Senator Metzenbaum); see also
Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Protection
of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Securi-
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and some of its leading proponents are pessimistic in their assess-
ment of the potential for enactment of a similar statute. 17 Notwith-
standing that defeat, those advocating reform in corporate govern-
ance express more optimism for the achievement of changes in
state law, especially changes bearing the prestigious imprimatur of
the American Law Institute ("ALI").
II. THE ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT
The ALI has undertaken a project with the purpose of achiev-
ing corporate reform. The project has two objectives: a) restate-
ment of the law where there is judicial authority deemed satisfac-
tory under modern standards, and b) recommendations "[wihere
there is no judicial authority, or where the cases are unsatisfactory
by modern standards - either because of their antiquity, or the
absence of compelling analysis, or because today they just seem
wrong."" s The ALI's project grew out of four conferences held dur-
ing 1977 and 1978.19 In April 1982, the ALI published Tentative
Draft No. 1 ("Draft") of the project, entitled Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommenda-
tions.2 0 Immediately upon dissemination, the debate over this con-
troversial document began.
Because the ALI Reporters have made significant changes to
the Draft since its initial publication, any attempt to analyze the
project at this point may be analogized, as suggested by the Presi-
dent of the ALI, to shooting at "a moving target.""1 Tentative
ties of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
360 (1980) (introduced by Congressman Rosenthal); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 7; Cary, supra note 15 (suggesting minimum federal standards for large publicly
held corporations).
17. See Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance (paper delivered at Ohio State
University Symposium on Corporate Governance, Oct. 20, 1983) (to be published in volume
45 of Ohio State Law Journal).
18. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS foreword at viii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
19. For a transcript of these conferences, see COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE
AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SyMposiuMs 1977-1978 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18. For a critical discussion of the Draft, see Scott, Cor-
poration Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 927 (1983); see also Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DuK" L.J. 959; Comment, Cor-
porate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Critique of the ALl Statement on Corporate
Governance Section 2.01(b), 71 CALIF. L. REV. 994 (1983).
21. R. Perkins, Background and Status of ALI Corporate Governance Project and Com-
mentary on Papers of Professors Andrews, Demsetz, and MacAvoy (Exhibits A, B and C to
Feb. 1983 Statement of the Business Roundtable) 9 (remarks at forum at the Association of
1983]
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Draft No. 1 contains only some of the parts (parts I, II, III, IV and
VII) that will ultimately constitute the entire project. The Draft
includes neither parts V and VI nor certain proposed additions ex-
pected to be included.22 Part I contains definitions of terms used
elsewhere in the Draft;" part II contains a statement regarding the
objective and conduct of the corporation;2 ' part III contains provi-
sions relating to the composition, structure, functions, and powers
of the board of directors and its committees;2 5 part IV deals with
the duty of care of corporate officers and directors and the busi-
ness judgment rule;26 and finally, the portions of part VII (reme-
dies) included in the Draft deal with derivative actions. 27
A. The Debate
The proponents of the ALI's corporate governance project do
not appear to attack the modern corporation on the basis of corpo-
rate social responsibility. On its face, the Draft recognizes share-
holders as the legitimate "owners" of the corporation. The propo-
nents state their concern that the perceived separation of
ownership from control has placed professional managers in a posi-
tion of control that enables them to act in their own interests and
not always in a manner consistent with the maximization of share-
holder wealth. Consequently, the ALI Reporters have proposed
arrangements designed to require, or to recognize as "good corpo-
rate practice," certain institutional reforms intended to achieve a
balance between the interests of shareholders and the perceived
incentives of management. The apparent goal of creating these in-
stitutional arrangements is to protect shareholder wealth from
managers expected to behave in ways inimical to shareholders.
Tentative Draft No. 1 incorporates a variety of changes from
the prevailing law-for example, a requirement that the boards of
large corporations consist of a majority of outside directors and of
independent audit and nominating committees." The Draft also
the Bar of the City of New York, Mar. 14, 1983).
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, table of contents at xiii-xvi.
23. Id. pt. I, at 1-16.
24. Basically, that statement recognizes the profit-maximization objective of the corpo-
ration and the goal of enhancing shareholder gain. See id. pt. II, at 17-43.
25. Id. pt. III, at 45-125.
26. Id. pt. IV, at 127-216.
27. Id. pt. VII, at 217-426.
28. See, e.g., id. § 3.03 comments c-e, at 74-77.
29. Id. §§ 3.03, 3.05-.06. Subsequent to the publication of Tentative Draft No. 1, the
Council of the ALI voted to delete the language of § 3.03 that would have mandated that at
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proposes, as a matter of "good corporate practice," an independent
compensation committee."0 Current law embodies none of these
proposals. Critics of the project perceive the Reporters' treatment
of the directors' duty of care and the business judgment rule as an
attempt to expand the liability of directors."1 Similarly, the Re-
porters' proposals concerning derivative litigation appear to make
derivative suits easier to bring and harder to dismiss.3 2
Debate within the legal and business communities over the
Draft is heated; it extends to the substantive proposals, the format
of the project, and the title of the first tentative draft. Critics have
described the first draft as a "hybrid document" having a format
never before used by the ALI. 3 Objections to the substance of the
draft focus upon the notion that Tentative Draft No. 1 fails to dis-
tinguish between provisions that actually restate the law and
materials that reflect only the Reporters' perceptions of "good cor-
porate practice." Thus, opponents of the draft argue that these de-
ficiencies may lead courts and others to the false belief that all
provisions are restatements of the law. Moreover, questions arise
about the legal status of recommendations made by the ALI re-
garding "good corporate practice." Some of the critics suggest that
the courts may treat deviation from such rules of "good corporate
practice" as "bad corporate practice" that is actionable by the cor-
poration or its shareholders. Responding to these criticisms, the
President of the ALI has stated that the Council of the ALI is ac-
tively considering renaming the project; the Council has also re-
quested that the Reporters sharpen the distinctions between actual
restatement provisions and recommendations or suggestions. 4
Resolution of problems relating to title and format will not ex-
tinguish the debate over the Draft's substantive provisions-a de-
bate pitting powerful organizations and institutions against each
other.3 5 Furthermore, the nature of the substantive issues in dis-
least a majority of the directors of large publicly held corporations be outsiders. The Council
asked that this be put on a "good corporate practice basis." R. Perkins, supra note 21, at 11.
A memorandum attached to Mr. Perkins' remarks reflects that Advisory Group Draft No. 3
of the project does not mandate the establishment of an independent nominating commit-
tee, but recommends it as "good corporate practice." R. Perkins, supra note 21, app. at 2.
30. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 3.07.
31. See THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 41 (1983).
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Perkins, supra note 21, at 12-13.
35. See, e.g., the debate between the Business Roundtable, THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE,
19831
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pute does not suggest any simple compromise. Supporters of the
ALI project believe that the Draft contains relatively modest pro-
posals that do not depart significantly from generally accepted or
clearly emerging corporate norms. Those in favor of the project as-
sume that management accountability is a prerequisite for the cor-
poration's attainment of legitimacy.3 6 They argue that the ALI
proposals based on director accountability to shareholders are not
radical.3 7 In short, the supporters argue, the uproar is much ado
about nothing.3 6
Critics of the Draft disagree. They assert that many current
corporate practices-such as practices relating to the composition
of boards of directors and the appointment of independent com-
mittees of the board-are part of an evolutionary process that will
be stifled by the inclusion of these practices in a document pur-
porting to be a restatement of the law. 9 Another objection to the
Draft is that it reflects only one of several models of the modern
board of directors. This argument suggests that some of the Draft's
provisions are inconsistent with current realities of corporate gov-
ernance.40 A more general objection is that current corporation law
works well and needs no adjustment.41 Still others emphasize the
deficiency of the scholarship underlying the Draft, which omits any
discussion of the management and economics literature regarding
corporate governance."' Finally, those satisfied with the status quo
believe that the market is a more efficient method of disciplining
managers, directors, and others than are formal rules such as those
incorporated in the Draft.43 Obviously, the Draft has engendered
substantial objections.
supra note 31, passim, and the American Law Institute, R. Perkins, supra note 21, at 14-27.
36. E.g., Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 223, 232 (1983).
37. See, e.g., id. at 225-27.
38. E.g., Steinberg, The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corporate
Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles, and Some General Observa-
tions, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295, 299 (1983).
39. E.g., Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1982, at 34.
40. Id. at 39.
41. See Ruder, Protections for Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?,
37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1983).
42. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 39, at 37.
43. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1283-84 (1982); see also West, supra note 6.
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B. The Views of the Symposium Participants
The participants in this symposium have varying substantive
viewpoints. Professor Eisenberg, one of the Reporters for the
Draft, believes that the separation of ownership from control re-
sults in a lack of protection for shareholders. For Professor Eisen-
berg, the ALI project is a modernization of corporate law, which
attempts, among other things, to recognize the need for institu-
tional arrangements that facilitate the accountability of managers
to shareholders. Because the Draft's provisions provide for moni-
toring of the performance of managers, he views the entire project
as helping to legitimize the modern corporation.
Professor Andrews expresses a different opinion of the Draft.
He contends that the provisions of the Draft are unrealistic and
fail to take into account the complexities of the large corporation.
Noting that the Draft ignores the recent evolution of the large cor-
poration as the dominant institution in our society, Professor An-
drews argues against freezing the evolving corporate norms into
the rigidity of a restatement. Moreover, he criticizes the failure of
the Reporters to understand the problems of corporate governance
and suggests that unless the Reporters take a more realistic view of
the modern corporation, the ALI project will not achieve its
objectives.
Professor Brudney characterizes the Draft as a reflection of
current corporate practice that contains no significant surprises for
the business community. In fact, he states, the Draft merely estab-
lishes minimum standards of performance that are not so strict as
to inhibit positive performance or achievement of efficient results.
Professor Brudney comments that the Draft's critics, many of
whom are seeking to block the ALI project, are attempting to di-
lute the directors' traditional obligations to shareholders.
Dean Ruder perceives the Reporters' objectives as unnecessa-
rily increasing the protections for shareholders beyond existing
law. He examines the existing federal and state laws and concludes
that the present regulation of corporate affairs strikes a proper bal-
ance between facilitating corporate business decisions without un-
due interference and protecting shareholders against injury by of-
ficers, directors, and controlling shareholders. Thus he finds no
need for a restatement of the law.
Mr. Smith speaks from his experience as a director of several
large corporations. He characterizes the project as more the Re-
porters' own statement of the prevailing corporate practices than
as a restatement of existing legal principles. In noting that no two
1983]
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corporate boards are alike, Mr. Smith urges that the key to an ef-
fective board is the flexibility to meet the needs of an everchanging
business environment. He believes that the Draft would operate as
a straitjacket on the effective operation of the board.
Professor Steinberg views the Reporters' deviations from ex-
isting law as a positive change. He advocates the exposure of
corporate fiduciaries to liability for ordinary negligence in ordinary
business transactions. He also finds that the standards imposed on
directors desiring to dismiss bothersome derivative suits do not im-
pose an undue burden on corporate fiduciaries. Professor Steinberg
concludes that the Draft represents a substantial increase in pro-
tections for shareholders at the expense of corporate fiduciaries
and that this result is desirable.
III. ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Although the papers included in this symposium contain inter-
esting and diverse views, their authors do not address at least two
important points that we should mention to complete this intro-
duction. First, there is a relative paucity of empirical evidence on
many of the important issues with which the Draft deals. Second,
there is a market for corporate control that provides significant
protections for shareholders.
A.. Empirical Evidence
At this symposium the commentators agreed that no empirical
study convincingly answers the questions of whether new law deal-
ing with corporate governance would improve shareholder or com-
munity welfare and whether the benefits of the ALI project would
outweigh the costs of compliance. In fact, no such empirical study
exists. Nevertheless, the proponents of the Draft persist in their
assertion, based primarily on their personal experiences and im-
pressions, that such law is desirable. Some commentators argue,
however, that personal and shared experiences do not justify the
promulgation of a restatement on corporate governance." One may
argue that the logic of a particular proposition-such as a rule re-
quiring a majority of independent directors or an independent au-
dit committee-is overwhelmingly clear. But when one attempts to
analyze these proposed rules, no such overwhelming logic emerges.
44. See, e.g., Wolfson, SEC Thinking and Lessons in Bureaucratizing the Corporation,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PAST & FUTURE 1, 8-21 (H. Manne ed. 1982).
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There is a popular assumption that independent directors can
monitor and assure successful management better than manage-
ment itself can. Commentators who disagree with this contention
suggest that senior managers have an incentive to monitor their
colleagues of equal rank; even junior managers have an incentive to
monitor their superiors. Behind the manager-as-monitor model is
the notion that the success of a manager's peers and superiors will
benefit the manager's own reputation and future compensation.4
Independent directors, however, occupy a less strategic position for
monitoring the performance of the firm than do managers. As part-
timers, independent directors have less time to devote to monitor-
ing activities. And because their compensation is not a function of
the success of the firm, independent directors, unlike managers,
have no financial incentive prompting them to act quickly and de-
cisively in correcting management's inefficiencies. Indeed, one may
expect that independent directors-when compared with manag-
ers-are less entrepreneurial, more receptive to the demands of
public interest groups than to the interests of shareholders, and
less efficient in disciplining inefficient employees.46
This reasoning does not emphatically lead to the conclusion
that inside directors are more desirable as monitors than are inde-
pendent directors. Rather, because there are many reasonable ar-
guments that support both sides of the question, the answer
should depend on empirical research. Also, arguably, it is inadvisa-
ble to impose a requirement for an independent board when a rule
and practice already exist that permit the selection of a balance of
independent and outside directors according to the needs of the
particular firm.
The preceding analysis is equally applicable to independent
audit, compensation, and nominating committees, and to other
Draft proposals. Each of these issues leads to the same conclusion,
i.e., that we are dealing with empirical propositions for which there
are rational arguments on both sides. The proponents of corporate
reform have not yet sustained the burden of proving the need for
the proposals they advocate.
Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence that the
Draft proposals are correct, researchers have begun to test the Re-
porters' hypotheses. The Business Roundtable, as part of its re-
45. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); see also Wolfson, supra note 44, at 9.
46. Wolfson, supra note 44, at 9-10.
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sponse to Tentative Draft No. 1, commissioned Professor MacAvoy
to test various hypotheses underlying the Draft. Examining his
data, MacAvoy found no empirical basis for the conclusion that
the Reporters' proposed structural models of the corporation
would achieve their objectives.4 7 In particular, he found that "[t]he
most important and statistically significant result is that there is
no indication here that the board structure has any impact on the
relative profitability performance of corporations."", Professor
MacAvoy similarly found, with respect to the ALI Reporters' rec-
ommendations on "socially responsible behavior" and corporate
compliance with the law, that his data showed no significant differ-
ences between firms having board characteristics like those advo-
cated by the ALI Reporters and those with different
characteristics.4'
The Berle and Means theory noted earlier, that ownership is
separate from control, underlies the ALI's project on corporate
governance. In a recent issue of The Journal of Law and Econom-
ics devoted entirely to the subject of corporate governance, Profes-
sors Stigler and Friedland empirically tested the basic tenets of the
Berle and Means theory. 0 Using data assembled in the 1920's and
1930's, Stigler and Friedland examined the question of whether
separation of ownership and control has any significance with re-
spect to the effective operation of business.5 1 Their data revealed
no significant relationship between the profitability of the corpora-
tion and the exercise of control by either management or the own-
ers of the corporation. 2 In addition, analyzing another body of
data, they found no significant relationship between executive
compensation and the type of control.5 3 Stigler and Friedland thus
concluded that there is no merit to the claim that separation of
ownership and control injures shareholders.
47. See MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana & Peck, ALI Proposals for Increased Control of the
Corporation by the Board of Directors: An Economic Analysis, reprinted in THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 31, exhibit C.
48. Id. at C-34.
49. See id. at C-38, C-42.
50. Stigler & Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means,
26 J.L. & ECON. 237 (1983).
51. Statistical regressions of corporate profits or corporate assets and type of control
were presented for 'five periods from 1928 to 1938. Id. at 256.
52. Id. at 254, 259.
53. The data used in the study was collected by the Federal Trade Commission for
1928 to 1932, the Securities and Exchange Commission for 1934 to 1935, and the Temporary
National Economic Committee and the Securities and Exchange Commission for 1937 to
1938. Id. at 249-54.
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In another empirical study, Professors Dodd and Leftwich
tested the effects on shareholder wealth of 140 changes in the state
of incorporation during the period from 1928 to 1967. 5  They
designed the study to test whether corporate management, in order
to exploit stockholders, deliberately chose Delaware as the state of
incorporation. In the twenty-five months prior to and including the
month that the firm switched the state of incorporation to Dela-
ware, stockholders of the firm earned a positive abnormal return
exceeding thirty percent. For a period of up to five years after the
change, there were basically no abnormal returns.
The evidence from the Dodd and Leftwich study is consistent
with the hypothesis that management switches the state of incor-
poration for the benefit of shareholders. As news of the intended
change in the state of incorporation becomes known to members of
the investment community, investors revise in an upward direction
their evaluations of the corporation's prospects, even before the
consummation of the switch. That reevaluation increases stock
prices, which in turn produces abnormally high returns for
shareholders.
A recent unpublished study tested the hypothesis of the exis-
tence of a universally appropriate form of corporation law. 5  The
study revealed that the choice of incorporating in a strict or liberal
corporate legal environment was contingent upon the concentra-
tion of the power of the shareholdings. States with strict corpora-
tion laws use more political and legal methods to regulate the per-
formance of management. Liberal states rely on the forces of the
market to control management's performance. The study found
that the more concentrated the shareholdings, the more the corpo-
rations tended to migrate to a state with strict corporation laws. In
strict versus liberal states, there was no significant difference, how-
ever, in the financial performance of corporations. Based upon
these findings, it follows that uniform corporation laws, such as
those proposed in the Draft, are inappropriate.
B. The Market for Corporate Control
As indicated earlier, this symposium would be incomplete un-
54. Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition"
versus Federal Regulations, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
55. B. Baysinger & H. Butler, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contin-
gency Theoretic Approach to the Control of Hired Managers (1984) (unpublished manu-
script, Department of Management, College of Business Administration, Texas A & M
University).
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less it included some discussion of the "market for corporate con-
trol.' " Under this theory, share prices work to discipline the be-
havior of corporate management. Inefficient management of a firm,
or management behavior that is inconsistent with profit maximiza-
tion, will cause the price of the firm's shares to fall to a level that
is consistent with the degree of mismanagement. Lower stock
prices make it easier (i.e., less costly) for outsiders to gain control
of the corporation and to generate profits for themselves through
the increase in share values that results from efficient manage-
ment. After gaining control, the former outsiders generally replace
the inefficient managers. Corporate managers thus have a strong
incentive to be attentive to the price of their firms' shares.
In contests for corporate control, insurgents seek potential
profits in the form of compensation for successful management,
from capital gains realized through an increase in share values, or
from both. It is this market for the profits derived from successful
management that constrains management behavior. If corporate
managers are inattentive to prevailing competition for the firm's
goods or services, the market will quickly reflect their behavior in
prices.5 7 Therefore, the market for corporate control exerts a con-
stant pressure on managers to monitor continually the firm's inter-
nal affairs and to behave in a manner that is consistent with the
maximization of shareholder wealth. This pressure does not, how-
ever, completely insulate efficient management against a takeover.
If an insurgent group determines that it can manage the corpora-
tion more efficiently than the incumbents can, the insurgents will
attempt to gain control of the corporation. Nevertheless, efficient
management decreases the risk of a successful takeover.
Critics of the market for corporate control theory have ques-
tioned its effectiveness as a protective device for shareholders."8
According to these critics, if there is little or no market competi-
56. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1430
(1964).
57. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-96
(1973); Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure under Federal Securities Laws, in
WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 32
(1974) (The Charles C. Moskowitz Lectures); Jensen, Problems in Selection of Security
Portfolios: The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. FIN. 389
(1968); Jensen, Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment
Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969); Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluc-
tuate Randomly, IND. MGMT. REV., Spring 1965, at 41; Williamson, Measurement and Fore-
casting of Mutual Fund Performance: Choosing an Investment Strategy, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 78.
58. E.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 7.
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tion for a firm's products or services, market forces lack the power
to restrain corporate management and are therefore inadequate to
protect shareholders. Critics point to regulated industries as exam-
ples of markets that lack competition."9
But even in regulated industries there is evidence that the
market for corporate control provides a mechanism for ensuring
efficient management behavior." Professor De Alessi hypothesized
that the tenure of managers of government-owned firms would be
longer than the tenure of managers in privately owned firms."'
Measuring the statistical differences in tenure patterns in govern-
ment and privately owned electric utilities, he concluded from the
empirical evidence that the profit constraint has more effect on
privately held than on publicly held utilities. In addition, Profes-
sors Tollison and Crain found that regulated private utilities do
not exhibit a significantly different tenure pattern for top manage-
ment than do unregulated private firms.2 These findings support
the theory that the market for corporate control works effectively
in all privately owned firms.
There is a second challenge to the theory of the effectiveness
of the market for corporate control. Some persons suggest that the
high costs of takeover campaigns may actually shield management
from accounting to shareholders." High takeover costs, however,
simply may indicate that the firm's management is very efficient,
which is good for stockholders. Whether the takeover is in the
form of a cash tender offer, proxy fight, or some other device, the
cost of the takeover is in fact directly related to stock prices: The
more efficiently managed the firm is, the higher are its stock prices;
efficiently managed firms thus have higher takeover costs than in-
efficiently run firms. In sum, it is the low takeover costs resulting
from the lower stock prices of poorly run firms that pose a threat
to management and hold them accountable to shareholders. 4
Nevertheless, government regulation has created takeover
costs in addition to the costs reflected in stock prices. Because of
the increased costs, the regulations impede the efficient function-
59. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 266 (1977).
60. De Alessi, Managerial Tenure under Private and Government Ownership in the
Electric Power Industry, 82 J. POL. ECON. 645 (1974).
61. Id.
62. Crain & Tollison, On the Sufficient Conditions for Wealth-Maximizing Conduct,
31 KYKLOS 500, 502 (1978).
63. E.g., Winter, supra note 59, at 268.
64. Id. at 269.
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ing of the market for corporate control.6 5 Elimination of these reg-
ulations would lower the expenses of a takeover, a desirable goal
for creating a more efficient market for corporate control.
Finally, the results of another study suggest that the rigid
rules in the Draft for monitoring management behavior are inap-
propriate, especially in light of the beneficial consequences of
strong market forces that discipline managers. The study, which
focused on a firm's measurement of input productivity and rewards
for the purpose of equating rewards with outputs, found that elim-
ination of management discretion would be damaging to share-
holders.6 In a particular firm, the marginal productivity of each
employee is difficult and costly to determine. Furthermore, aggre-
gating the separate outputs of each employee will not provide an
accurate measure of individual productivity. An employee has an
incentive to shirk his responsibilities if his reward (salary, for ex-
ample) is relatively unrelated to his productivity. Thus, it is essen-
tial that someone monitor the various inputs of employees to meter
marginal productivity and to eliminate shirking. The monitor must
gather information on productivity and on shirking.
The monitor and the persons he meters are, of course, mem-
bers of the same team. This necessitates a device to reduce the
monitor's incentive to shirk. That device, suggest Professors Alchi-
an and Demsetz, is the allocation to the monitor of residual income
after payment of other inputs. 7 This arrangement provides the
monitor with an incentive to channel others' inputs in an efficient
way, because his returns will be dependent on his ability to moni-
tor effectively. For corporations, managers are monitors. Most
shareholders are not interested in performing this task. But even if
shareholders were interested, dispersion of share ownership makes
monitoring impractical.
The notion that the residual income of a firm belongs only to
the shareholders is incorrect. In fact, management has a residual
share directly related to the cost of a takeover. Management can
maintain the prohibitive cost of a takeover by increasing the yield
to shareholders. The corporation is, therefore, the vehicle through
65. An example of government regulation in the corporate community is the Securities
and Exchange Commission's regulations governing tender offers. Manne, Cash Tender Of-
fers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231; Smiley, The Effect of
the Williams Amendment and Other Factors on Transactions Costs in Tender Offers, 3
INDUS. ORG. REV. 3 (1975).
66. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
67. Id. at 782.
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which a substantial number of investors may aggregate capital
while an efficient metering mechanism monitors the various inputs
and rewards of management. These results flow almost entirely
from strong market forces and are independent of complex rules of
law intended to constrain the behavior of corporate managers. In-
deed, these results may be achieved with only a few basic rules,8
none of which is as complex as the suggestions of the Reporters in
Tentative Draft No. 1.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis and the views of the authors at this
symposium demonstrate, it is not surprising that the American
Law Institute project on corporate governance is laced with contro-
versy. It is equally clear that there is no simple method for resolu-
tion of such differing views. Accordingly, one is safe in predicting a
long and heated debate as the project takes it course. These pa-
pers, we hope, will serve as a focal point in that process.
68. Winter, supra note 59, at 290.
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